The flourishing synergy arising between organized crimes and the Internet has increased the insecurity of the digital world. How hackers frame their actions? What factors encourage and energize their behavior? These are very important but highly underresearched questions. We draw upon literatures on psychology, economics, international relation and warfare to propose a framework that addresses these questions. We found that countries across the world differ in terms of regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy to different types of web attacks. Cyber wars and crimes are also functions of the stocks of hacking skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities. An attacking unit's selection criteria for the target network include symbolic significance and criticalness, degree of digitization of values and weakness in defense mechanisms. Managerial and policy implications are discussed and directions for future research are suggested.
Who are the cyber attackers? A survey conducted among the members of the Confederation of British Industry indicated that the attackers in the most serious cybercrimes in 2000 were hackers (44.8%), former employees (13.4%), organized criminal groups (12.8%), current employees (11.5%), customers (7.9%), competitors (5.8%), political and protest groups (2.6%) and terrorists (1.4%) (BBC News 2001) . A large proportion of such attacks are international in scope (Table 1) . A 2002 survey of Australian firms indicated that foreign governments were perceived sources of attacks for 24% respondents and foreign corporate for 30% (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2002) .
Although the US is the No. 1 source country for web attacks, its share in the global cybercrime industry is decreasing rapidly. The proportion of attacks originated from the US dropped from 58% in the second half of 2003 to 37% in the first half of 2004 (Symantec, 2004) . It should, however, be noted that the country of origination of a cyber attack is extremely fuzzy. Many cybercrimes originate in one country but are initiated by attacking units in different territories. For instance, in 1999, two members of a US-based "Phonemasters" were convicted for attacking the networks of U.S. telecomm companies. One of them downloaded thousands of Sprint calling card numbers that were sold to intermediaries in Canada and Switzerland and finally ended up with an organized group in Italy (Williams, 2001) . Similarly, a hacker accused of pirating DirecTV and EchoStar signals in Florida told law enforcement authorities that he had received request from Afghanistan to provide hacking services (Lieberman, 2003) . In the same vein, ShadowCrew, the international clearinghouse for stolen credit cards and identity documents, whose masterminds were arrested in the US in the mid-2005, had 4000 members in a number of countries including Bulgaria, Canada, Poland, Sweden and the US (Grow and Bush, 2005) . Likewise, Australian scammers have established links with Russian and Malaysian organized crime networks to transfer stolen money from overseas banks they have cracked into (Foreign Policy, 2005) .
Targeted web attacks are not limited to networks of large organizations. Such attacks accounted for 10% of total attacks in small businesses in the first half of 2004 compared to 3% in the second half of 2003 (Symantec, 2004, p. 17) . Table 1 ranks the world's top nations in terms of cyber attacks and frauds on the Internet. One estimate suggests that less than 1% of computer attacks originate in countries that the US considers breeding grounds for terrorists and hackers (The Economist, 2003) . Another estimate suggests that 60% of fraudulent transactions originate from just 15 nations.
A country with a strong rule of law, on the other hand, has "sound political institutions, a strong court system" and citizens that are "willing to accept the established institutions and to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes" (International Country Risk Guide, 1996) . Put differently, a strong rule of law is characterized by effective punishment to transgressors and sanctions against defectors and thus enhances the ability to successfully litigate fraudulent dealings on the Internet (Oxley and Yeung, 2001) . A strong rule of laws thus provides negative motivations for hackers.
Eastern Europe and Russia's weak cybercrime laws have provided a fertile ground for computer crimes. Notwithstanding many Eastern Europe countries 12 enactment of cybercrime laws, they lack enforcement mechanisms (see Box 1 for Russia). The discussion in this section is summarized as: Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus 13 , the rate of origin of online attacks in an economy is negatively related to the strength of rule of laws applied to such attacks.
Normative institutions
Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott, 1995, 37) . Practices that are consistent with and take into account the different assumptions and value systems of the national cultures are likely to be successful (Schneider, 1999) . Cybercrimes are more justifiable in some societies compared to others. Blau (2004) describes how a Russian hacker-turned-teacher and his friends hacked programs and distributed them for free: "It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] like Robin Hood bringing programs to people". Similarly, many Indonesian hackers feel that cyber fraud is wrong but acceptable if the victim is from a developed country (see Box 2) .
Elements of normative institutions also include trade associations or professional associations that can use social obligation requirements to induce certain behavior within the hacking community. For instance, the members of the Honker Union of China (also known as the Red Hackers) are required to behave according to the guidelines set by the organization. We propose that:
Proposition 2. The rate of origin of online attacks in an economy is positively related to the existence of social norms that justify such attacks.
Cognitive institutions
Cognitive institutions are associated with culture (Jepperson, 199 1) . These components represent culturally supported habits that influence hackers' behavior. In most cases, they are associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns that are based on subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-granted cultural account of computer use (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) . Scott (1995, 40) suggests that "cognitive elements constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made''. Cognitive programs affect the way people notice, categorize, and interpret stimuli from the environment. Although carried by individuals, cognitive programs are social in nature (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) . Compliance in the case of cognitive legitimacy concerns is due to habits; hackers may not even be aware that they are complying.
Ideology 14
Ideology is an important component of cognitive institutions that energizes the behavior of many computer hackers. A number of cyber attacks are linked with fights for ideology. Ideological hackers 15 attack websites to further political purposes. As it will become clear shortly, such hackings can be mapped with obligation/ community-based intrinsic motivations.
While some ideological hackers express nationalistic longings (see next section and Box 3) by acting up in line with the government (de Kloet, 2002) , others act against the nation-state where they live. For instance, in the mid-2001, Cyberjihad, a group of hackers in Indonesia attacked the Web site of the Indonesian police to force them to free a militant Muslim leader (Antariksa, 2001, p. 15) . Similarly, in October 2001, a hacker in China replaced a Chinese government website with pornographic contents (de Kloet, 2002) . In addition to nationalism and religion, hackers' interests are also framed by fight against global capitalism (de Kloet, 2002) . Such hackers are likely to attack networks of big multinationals.
Hackings by Islamic activists are also interesting examples of ideological cyber attacks. Except for occasional India-Pakistan and Israel-Palestine cyber wars, hacking by Islamist activists was insignificant before September 11, 2001 . mi2g Intelligence Unit reported increasing Islamist hacking, the targets being networks of the US, Britain, Australia and other coalition partners as well as domestic networks of Russia, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Kuwait. 17 To take yet another example of ideological hacking, in June 1998, six hackers from the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and New Zealand (identifying themselves as Milworm) hacked the Web site of India's Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and left a message: "If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream" (Denning, 2000) . Similarly, in South Korea, 58 Internet servers were attacked by a Japanese student in November 2003 to protest the war in Iraq (Dukkun, 2003) .
Nationalism and patriotism 18, 19 can be considered as conceptual subsets of ideology. These are universally accepted as vital elements of state strength (Alagappa, 1995, 26-7) . Salmon (1995) argues that "patriotism or attachment to one's country often leads to actions and attitudes which are disinterested or self-sacrificing, help solve free-riding problems" (p. 296). We can find many instances of hackings linked to nationalism and patriotism. To take an example, in the early 1990s, a group of Portuguese hackers named TOXYN infiltrated a number of Indonesian government websites to fight against the occupation of East Timor (de Kloet, 2002) . Indonesian hackers responded by attacking Portuguese servers that hosted the East Timor movement (Antariksa, 2001 ). To take another example, in 1997, cyber attacks occurred in Sri Lanka in support of the Tamil Tiger separatists. The strike was intended to disrupt government communications by overloading Sri Lankan embassies with millions of e-mails (Havely, 2000) . To take yet another example, in 1998, Indian army's website on Kashmir was "hijacked" by supporters of Pakistan's claim to the disputed territory, who plastered the site with their own political slogans (Havely, 2000) . In response, in July 2001, the website of the Pakistan based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Tayiba was attacked by a hacker who called himself `True Indian' (Peer, 2001) . It was in response to attacks of G-force, a Pakistani hacker group, to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs' websites.
Nationalism and patriotism were dominant codes of appeal in the US-China cyber wars of April-May 2001 (see Box 3) . Quoting a security engineer from Guangdong Province of China, Netease 20 reported the daily number of attacks increased by over 20 times the average during April-May, 2001 . Analyzing the US-China cyber wars, Kluver (2001, p. 8) concluded that "the technological optimism which sees in the Internet the end of nationalism and parochialism is an unrealistic understanding of how the Internet functions as a medium for human interaction". The next proposition is: Proposition 3. An organization's conflict of ideology with a hacking unit is likely to result in cyber attacks by the latter against the former.
Stock of hacking skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities
Unlike conventional crimes against persons or property such as rape, burglary and murder, cybercrimes are very skill intensive. Stock of hacking skills is thus a prerequisite to online crimes. Whereas minimal skill is needed for opportunistic attacks, targeted attacks require more sophisticated skills.
Crime rates are, however, tightly linked to the lack of economic opportunities. Becker (1995, p. 10) comments on the increased number of crimes committed by teenagers: ... [L]ow earnings are a factor behind crime, and teenagers have lower earnings and fewer opportunities.
The combination of over-educated and under-employed computer experts has made Russia and some Eastern European countries fertile ground for hackers. In these counties, there are a large number of students good at mathematics, physics and computer science but having difficulties to find jobs (Blau, 2004) . The situation was exacerbated by a financial crash in 1998 that left many computer programmers unemployed. A self-described hacker from Moscow told reporters: "Hacking is one of the few good jobs left here" (Walker, 2004) . Regarding computer attacks originating from Romania, the US-based Internet Fraud Complaint Center, run by the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center has reported: "Frustrated with the employment possibilities offered in Romania, some of the world's most talented computer students are exploiting their talents online" (Romania Gateway, 2003) .
A large number of extortion related cyberattacks originate from Eastern Europe and Russia (see Box 1). These hackers possess capability to do very sophisticated attacks with limited computer power (Walker, 2004) . It can be attributed to Russia's highly educated workforce and programming skills. 21 Russian hackers have a deep understanding of networks and know how to "get in and out without a trace" (Walker, 2004) . The above leads to the following: Proposition 4. The rate of origin of online crimes in an economy is positively related to the stock of hacking skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities.
Types of cyber attacks
Cyber attacks can be classified into two types: targeted and opportunistic attacks. In targeted attacks, specific tools are used against specific cyber targets. Opportunistic attacks, on the other hand, entail releasing worms and viruses that spread indiscriminately across the Internet. At this point, it must be emphasized that targeted attacks more dangerous than opportunistic attacks and many of them have bigger financial ramifications. Moreover, the proportion of cyber attacks that are targeted is increasing over time.
Targeted attacks are carried out by skilled hackers with expertise to do serious damages. Some of them are motivated by financial gains (see Boxes 1 and 2). Targeted attacks are also initiated by terrorists, rival companies, ideological hackers or government agencies. The government of Burma, for instance, reportedly monitors online critics of the regime and sends them viruses attached in emails (Havely, 2000) . Similarly, in August 2004, six hackers were convicted by a Californian court for their involvement in DoS attacks against business rivals (Leyden, 2004) .
Motivation
A deeper understanding of web attacks requires an examination of motivation (Coates, 2002) that energizes the behavior of a hacking unit. The nature of web attacks allows us to draw an analogy with conventional wars. Just like in the physical world, wars on the web are fought for material ends as well as for intangible goals such as honor, dominance and prestige (Hirshleifer,1998) . Drawing from psychology and economics literature, we divide these motivations into two categories.
Intrinsic motivation
The theory of intrinsic motivation is based on the premise that human need for competence and selfdetermination are linked with interest and enjoyment (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 35) . According to Ryan and Deci (2000) , intrinsically motivated individuals do activities for "inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence". They argue that "when intrinsically motivated, a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures or rewards". Intrinsic motivation can be separated into two separate constituents: (1) enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation and (2) obligation/communitybased intrinsic motivation (Lindenberg, 2001 ).
Enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation
Central to the concept of intrinsic motivation is having fun or enjoying oneself when taking part in an activity (Deci and Ryan, 1985) . Csikszentmihalyi (1975) , one of the first psychologists to study the enjoyment dimension, emphasized that some activities were pursued for the sake of enjoyment derived from doing them. Csikszentmihalyi refers it to a satisfying flow of activity. Shapira (1976) argues that this category of motivation is related with fulfilling a challenging task without an external reward. Maverick hackers, for instance, attack websites because of the perceived challenges and without any desire for financial incentives. Lindenberg (2001) argues that acting on the basis of principle is also a form of intrinsic motivation. He argues that individuals may be socialized into acting appropriately and in a manner consistent with the norms of a group. The goal to act consistently within the norms of a group can trigger a normative frame of action (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005) . The group to which hackers associate themselves could be a nation, a territory, a terrorist organization or an association of hackers. The obligation/community goal is strongest when gain seeking (gaining personal advantage at the expense of other group members) by individuals within the reference community is minimized (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005) .
Obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation

Extrinsic motivation
Economists have contributed to our understanding of how extrinsic motivations drive human behavior. Economic theory suggests that human behavior is a result of "incentives applied from outside the person" (Frey, 1997, 13) . The benefits accruing to the individual may be immediate or delayed. The amount of financial incentives and the amount of motivation driving a hacker's behavior co-vary positively. Extrinsically motivated hackers are thus likely to attack networks of companies with higher digitization of values (higher potential financial incentives). For instance, cyber extortionists target online casinos, banks, and e-commerce hubs. These attacks are carefully planned. After cracking into victims' computers systems, extortionists normally send emails demanding that ransoms as high as $100,000 be sent via money transfer agencies such as Western Union. Companies are threatened with sophisticated disruption of their computer systems if they do not comply. Although some victims reject demands for money and absorb cyber attack, other victims choose to pay (also see Box 1).
Combination of motivations
In many cases, human behavior is driven by multiple motivations-different forms of intrinsic and extrinsic (Lindenberg, 2001 ). Thus, a person who wants to make money and also have fun is likely to choose opportunities that give economic reward (ransom from hacking a e-commerce website) with a sense of having fun (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005) . To take one example, the hackers protesting India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 not only fought for ideology (community-based intrinsic motivation), but also admitted they attacked the website for thrills (enjoyment based intrinsic motivation) (Denning, 2000) . The combination of motivations also changes over time. Blau (2004) quotes a Russian hacker: "There is more of a financial incentive [extrinsic motivation] now for hackers and crackers as well as for virus writers to write for money and not just for glory or some political motive [intrinsic motivation]".
Profile of target organization
Symbolic significance and criticalness
The ideal targets for terrorists of September 11, 2001 were the World Trade Center's Twin Towers, the White House and the Pentagon, the ones with tremendous symbolic significance (Coates, 2002) . Hackers similarly have ideal targets. Attacks initiated by terrorists are likely to be targeted against decisive and critical infrastructure systems such as telecommunications, the supply of gas, oil and fuel (Comité Européen Des Assurances, 2004) .
Following the collision of an American spy plane and a Chinese jet in April 2001, Chinese and U.S. hackers attacked each other's websites. Each camp selected websites that had symbolic values. In the US, the White House's site was shut down for many hours; there was a virus attack against computers at the California Department of Justice; and Ohio's Bellaire School District site played the Chinese national anthem displaying Chinese flag (Smith, 2001) . In China, sina.com, one of the most popular portals; the website of Xinhua news agency; and those of local governments were attacked (The Happy Hacker, 2001) . Thus, we propose that: Proposition 5. The symbolic significance and criticalness of a network increases its likelihood of being a cybercrime target.
Digitization of value
Crimes target sources of value, and for this reason, digitization of value is tightly linked with digitization of crime. 22 Large companies have larger networks which offer more targets to hackers. A survey of Riptech indicated that attackers are more likely to launch targeted attacks against larger companies than smaller. Businesses with a high dependence on digital technologies-including online casinos, banks, and e-commerce hubs-are more likely to be the target (Kshetri, 2005) for extrinsically motivated hackers. For instance, estimates suggest that a few hours downtime on Super Bowl weekend cost online casinos up to $1 million (Onlinecasinonews.com, 2004) . According to IDC, over 60% of computer hacks targeted financial institutions in 2003 (Swartz, 2004) . Similarly, in the first half of 2004, 16% of e-commerce attacks were targeted compared to 4% in 2003 (Symantec, 2004) . Thus: Proposition 6. The degree of digitization of value of an organization increases its likelihood being a cybercrime target.
Weakness of defense mechanisms
Weakness of defense mechanism co-varies positively with the likelihood of an attack. In the conventional world, for instance, a female-headed household is positively related to the probability of being a crime target (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999) . In the digital world, hackers in most cases take advantage of unfixed software holes. Due to weak defenses of most computer networks, it is difficult track origins of cyber attacks (Kong and Swartz, 2000) . Based on the above, a final proposition pertaining to the likelihood of an organization's network being attacked is:
Proposition 7. Weakness of defense mechanisms of a network is positively related to its likelihood of being a cybercrime target.
Discussion and implications
This paper has contributed to the conceptual and empirical understanding of global cyber wars and crimes. The analyses of the paper indicated that the nature of the source of a web attack is a function of the nature of regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy to the attacking unit; and stocks of hacking skills relative to the availability of economic opportunities. An attacking unit's selection criteria for the target include symbolic significance and degree of digitization of values. Extrinsically motivated hackers are likely to attack the networks with high degree of digitization of values. These include financial institutions, e-commerce hubs and online casinos. Intrinsically motivated hackers' targeted attacks, on the other hand, are directed towards organizations that with symbolic significance and criticalness. These include websites of government, critical infrastructures and also some companies that are perceived as national symbol. Different motivations of hackers, source characteristics and target country characteristics lead to different likelihoods of attacks on different organizations. Put differently, an independent variable may have different coefficients in regressions with attacks on different organizations as dependent variables.
Nations across the world differ widely on key elements represented in Fig. 1 and hence on domestic/foreign composition of sources and targets of cyber attacks as well as attackers' motivations. To illustrate from the U.S. perspective, in Table 2 , we have classified targeted cyber attacks impacting the US by national border in terms of target and source. This paper has important managerial implications. First, the global cybercrime landscape is moving toward a higher proportion of targeted attacks. All organizations, however, are not equally attractive cybercrime targets. Whereas symbolic significance and criticalness of a network attract intrinsically motivated cyber criminals, larger businesses and those with a high dependence on digital technologies are lucrative targets for hackers that work for money. It is thus important for firms to assess the risks of their networks being cybercrime targets and devise appropriate defense mechanisms.
Second, like other technologies, deployment of defense mechanisms tends to diffuse from large to small organizations. This is commonly known as the rank effect in economics literature (Gotz, 1999) . As large companies put stronger defense mechanisms against cyberattacks, small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) are more likely to become cybercrime targets. The proportion of total cybercrimes that target SMEs is thus likely to increase.
Third, cybercrimes are among the most underreported forms of criminality. Experts say less than 10% of cybercrimes are reported to authorities (Bednarz, 2004) . In the conventional world, research has indicated that time taken to report a crime is one of the most important factors in determining the probability of arrest (National Institute of Justice, 2001) . Timely reporting of cyberattacks to authorities is thus likely to strengthen the rules of law and help combat cyber threats in the long run.
Fourth, some companies have set a dangerous precedent of negotiating with web terrorists by paying ransoms. Estimates suggest that gambling sites alone have paid millions of dollars to cyber extortionists annually. Ransom money sends positive cognitive messages and will fuel further cyberattacks by making criminals more sophisticated and organized. As criminals' skill, organization and intelligence co-vary positively with the odds of getting away with crimes (National Center for Policy Analysis, 2002), paying ransom contributes to the vicious circle of cybercrimes. This paper also has several policy implications. First, there is no pure technological fix for security related problems involving technologies (Carblanc and Moers, 2003, Skolnikoff, 1989) . Cooperation and collaboration among national governments, computer crime authorities and businesses are critical to combat cyber attacks. If national governments work with one another as well as with business communities to modify institutions by defining appropriate policies for the security of the digital world, it will result in lower transaction costs. Some signs of success have materialized, 23 but nations have very far to go before they can achieve even a moderate level of success. For instance, although Russia has signed agreements to help the US in investigating some crimes, computer crimes are not among them (Lemos, 2001) . In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice requested the assistance of Russian authorities but received no response (Lemos, 2001 ).
Second, enacting laws that require organizations to deploy appropriate defense mechanisms and making reporting of cybercrimes mandatory can help combat such crimes. U.S. government, for instance, requires commercial banks to secure their networks. The Patriot Act and the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act require new security measures including customer identification and privacy protection. Despite the existence of similar regulations for decades, the Patriot Act reflected a change in the U.S. banking landscape. Since the mid-2004, South Korea's National Cyber Security Center has mandated that all Internet-related hacking incidents must be reported (Ho, 2004) . Many countries, however, do not have such laws.
Third, many countries are changing the regulative landscape towards severity of punishment. For instance, the U.S. Patriot Act brought cyber attacks into the definition of terrorism with penalties of up to 20 years in prison. The probability of arrest in cybercrimes is, however, very low since conventional law enforcement authorities lack skills required in dealing with such crimes. The severity of punishment is important, but what is still more critical in enhancing cyber safety is the certainty of punishment (Becker, 1995) . The probability of arrest is likely to increase with more investments in the development of law enforcement capabilities.
Fourth, many small and poor countries lack resources to investigate cybercrimes (see Box 2) . Big and rich nations' assistance to these countries, especially those with high rates of origin of cybercrimes, is urgently needed to combat global cyber threats originating from these countries.
Finally, various components of institutions, despite their connotation of persistence (Parto, 2005) , durability (Hodgson, 2003) and stability (Scott, 2001, p.48) , are subject to change in evolutionary time (Parto, 2005) . Zucker (1988, p. 26 ) draws an analogy from physics to describe institutional change mechanisms. He argues that institutions continuously undergo change due to entropy, a tendency toward disorder or disorganization (p. 26). An implication of the entropy-like characteristics is that people can modify and reproduce (Scott, 2001) institutions. Managers and governmental officials thus can singly or cooperatively eliminate or at least minimize institutional forces that promote deviant cyber behavior. 24 In addition to enacting new laws to minimize cyber threats (change in regulative institutions), they can devise strategy to change social norms (change in normative institutions) that influence hackers' behavior.
An important area of future research concerns operationalizing the constructs discussed in this paper and testing the model presented in Fig. 1 . Two possible approaches can be employed for this purpose. The first approach entails testing the model based on country-level data. Although Fig. 1 employs different levels of analysis, sources and target characteristics can be aggregated at the country level. For this purpose, Table 3 provides some measures of cyber safety and a non-exhaustive list of factors that reflect and determine the cyber safety environment.
The second approach is to apply economics of crimes to test the influence of characteristics of the source nation on hackers' willingness to commit cybercrimes. Following the economic approach, a cyber criminal weighs benefits and costs to make decision about engaging in a crime. A cybercrime is thus committed if the sum of perceived monetary benefits and perceived psychic benefits exceeds perceived psychic costs of committing a cybercrime plus the expected penalty effect (which is the product of the probability of arrests, the probability of conviction and perceived monetary opportunity costs of conviction) (Probasco and Davis, 1995) . Surveys consisting of impacts of regulative, normative and cognitive institutions; and availability of economic opportunities on hackers' assessment of perceived cost-benefit of cybercrimes can be employed to test the model presented in Fig. 1 . Respondents could be hackers and/or computer network experts from a number of countries. Similarly, surveys can also be conducted to predict profiles of target organization that different categories of hackers consider worthwhile to attack.
Preliminary evidence discussed in this paper indicates the shift in hackers' motivations from intrinsic to extrinsic. In this regard, another fruitful avenue for future research is to understand the determinants of the turning point. In-depth interviews with extrinsically motivated hackers would help understand how institutional and economic factors discussed in this paper transform motivations of attacking computer networks. As mentioned above, all companies do not report attacks on their networks. Additional research is also needed to identify the determinants of self-selection bias in the reporting of cyber attacks. What factors distinguish firms that report attacks on their networks from those that do not? Are there international variations in the reporting patterns?
Notes:
1 Unlike in the traditional warfare, it is almost impossible to identify the attacker in the IT warfare. Victims may not know whether an attacker is a teenager or terrorist, a rival company or a foreign government. In the famous Storm Cloud case, for instance, U.S. officials were not able to determine whether a foreign government led to the arrest of the members of an online extortion ring accused of blackmailing online sports betting websites that cost British companies $120 million (sophos.com, 2004) . 24 The author thanks a JIM reviewer for suggesting this point.
